Update Kira Liquidity Pool Locker

Description

This proposal, if passed, will fix a deposit limit bug of the Kira Liquidity Pool Locker present in proposal number 448.

Currently, the LP locker contract checks the user's balance 2 times. First, when the user calls the token contract to transfer the amount of tokens they want to lock to the LP Locker contract, and second, when creating the lock. Since the lock is being handled in the token receive handler, the amount the user wants to send is already deducted from their current token balance. This means if the user has a balance of X, they can only lock X/2 since the balance is checked twice.

In other words, this bug creates a deposit limit of 50%, which forces users to perform multiple locks to be able to lock all of their tokens. With this new update, this deposit limit bug will be fixed and users will be able to lock all of their LP tokens in one go, making the Kira LP locker more user friendly.

We want to point out that this issue is not a security issue but a bad design, aka bug. At no point are locked funds exposed to any security vulnerabilities. The Kira LP Locker was pentested by DegenDevs and fully audited by IronNode with an emphasis on the safety of locker users' funds. This small contract update that fixes the deposit limit bug has also been checked and approved by IronNode.

You can visit the Kira LP locker here: https://www.kira.build/lplocker

You can read the full audit report by IronNode here: https://www.kira.build/kiralp.pdf

TECHNICAL DETAILS:

Contract Name: liquidity_locker

Contract Version: 0.0.1

Compiler Version: cosmwasm/rust-optimizer:0.12.12

Checksum: 90dc09384bd337d031da3ef0a28fd75bc2df19d9853e22037f39647f8923bfa4

ACTIONS:

• By voting YES on this proposal, you agree to fix the 50% deposit limit bug of the Kira Liquidity Pool Locker.
• By voting NO on the proposal, you do not allow the 50% deposit limit bug of the Kira Liquidity Pool Locker to be fixed.
• By voting NO WITH VETO, you find this proposal to be (1) spam, i.e., irrelevant to the Injective ecosystem, (2) disproportionately infringes on minority interests, or (3) violates or encourages violation of the rules of engagement as currently set out by Injective governance. If the number of NoWithVeto votes is greater than a third of the total votes, the proposal is rejected and the 100 INJ deposit is burned.
• By voting ABSTAIN, you wish to contribute to the quorum while formally declining to vote either for or against the proposal.